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In the armed forces of First World countries, Information Operations 
(INFOOPS) are little short of being considered a new branch of service.  
According to the NATO definition, INFOOPS is a military function, which 
influences the intentions, comprehension and ability of enemy forces through 
advising and the coordination of military information operations in order to 
achieve the desired impact, thus supporting the mission goals of the allied 
forces. On a tactical level, it means the influencing of the decision-making 
system of local (political, religious, etc.) leaders with a view to achieving that 
their decisions create an advantageous position for the commander and the 
troops.
1
 
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is an essential capacity of 
information operations. While CIMIC activities have been increasingly efficient 
at the Hungarian units serving in various missions and formations (KFOR 
contingent, Afghanistan PRT, etc.), Hungarian soldiers have seen service in 
individual assignments, including under the aegis of the UN, the EU and the 
AU.
2
 In such missions, CIMIC activities often manifest themselves quite 
differently from those under Hungarian conditions or in NATO-led missions. I 
would like to share my relevant experiences obtained in 2005, in the Darfur 
peace-keeping mission led by the African Union. I hope that these pieces of 
information will also prove useful for others (I work as a functional expert in 
humanitarian aid in the Expert Group of the Civil-Military Cooperation and 
Psychological Operations Centre of the Ministry of Defence). It should, 
however, be noted that the views expressed below reflect my own personal 
experience rather than the position of the Hungarian Defence Forces. 
Before I proceed, I would like to share a few pieces of information on 
Darfur and the situation there. Darfur, originally Dar fúr (‘the Fúr people’s 
home) is the name of a region in western Sudan, adjacent to the Central African 
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Republic, Libya and Chad. A conflict of international scale has been going on in 
the region since 2003.
3
 
Darfur covers an area of 493,180 km², about the size of France. The 
region largely consists of an arid plateau and the Jabal Mara Mountains rising to 
3,000 metres. In 1989, following the military coup, General Omar El-Bashir 
ordered that the territory of the earlier sultanate, annexed by the British to Sudan 
in 1917, be divided into three federal states.
4
 
They are Garb Darfur (West Darfur), Djanub Darfur (South Darfur) and 
Samal Darfur (North Darfur), their centres being respectively Al Geneina, Nyala 
and El Fasher. 
The population of Darfur is app. 7.4 million. The economy is mainly 
agriculture-based, the main crops are fruits, tobacco and grain crops. Main 
languages: Arabic, Beigo, Daju, Erenga, Fongoro, Fulbe, Fur, Kujarge, Massalit, 
Sinyar, Tama and Zaghawa.
5
 
In 2003, a bloody insurgency broke out in Darfur, in which the Arab-
controlled Sudan government was opposed to two African insurgent groups, the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). 
The rebels were accusing the government with giving preference to Arabs over 
Africans.
6
 
The government responded with bombings and the deployment of military 
and police units and later of the ‘Janjaweed’ militia (armed Arab horsemen). 
The Janjaweed are charged with the massive violation of human rights, 
including mass murder as well as the pillaging of the non-Arab population of 
Darfur and rape. 
By spring 2004, thousands of people had been killed and hundreds of 
thousands had been forced to leave their homes due to the humanitarian disaster 
afflicting the region. The Arab paramilitary troops, however, continued looting, 
including the raiding of refugee camps in Chad. 
                                                 
3 Mohamed H. Fadlalla: Short History of Sudan, p. 57 
4 J. Millard Burr, Robert O. Collins: Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster, p. 287 
5 Mohamed Fadlalla: The Problem of Dar Fur, pp. 23-28 
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Source: civil war and revolution in the Sudan p.12 
At international pressure, the belligerent parties made truce on April 8
th
 
2004.
7
 The ceasefire was also signed by Chad and representatives of the 
international community. While the armistice took effect on April 14
th
, it was 
repeatedly infringed by both sides.
8
 At the same time, the UN adopted a 
decision, calling the African Union to organise a peace-keeping mission. At 
increasing pressure by the international community, the setting up of the mission 
was approved by the Sudan government and the opposition organisations. At the 
start of the mission (AMIS-I), 138 military observers (MILOB) and a 195-strong 
Force Protection Unit were posted in Darfur.
9
  
The number of the mission was increased in October the same year 
(AMIS-II), as a result of which 686 military observers, 815 policemen 
(CIVPOL) and 1,700 armed troops were now posted in Sudan. African 
politicians, however, soon realised that these forces were insufficient to control 
                                                 
7 Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, 
security, and governance, p. 83 
8 J. Millard Burr, Robert O. Collins: Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster, pp. 295-296 
9 Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, 
security, and governance, p. 85 
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a region the size of France.
10
Partly because of that, and partly in order to prevent 
the first independent AU peace-keeping mission from failure, a decision was 
adopted on increasing the number of the contingent as soon as possible (Addis 
Ababa meeting of March 19
th
 2005). According to the decision, by September 
2005, the strength of the mission reached 7,731 (6,171 soldiers and 1,560 
policemen).
11
 In 2006, the leaders of the AU intended to increase the strength of 
the mission by a further 4,000 troops. That objective, however, failed due to the 
reluctance of the participating states and the lack of funding. According to 
General Romeo Dallaire, leading the UN mission in Rwanda, the success of the 
Darfur mission would have required the sending of at least 44,000 peace-
keepers, which, however, did not come about.
12
 
Since the AMIS was unable to pacify the region, the UN took charge of 
the control of the operation on January 1
st
 2008.
13
 While UNAMID, the new 
mission, has also witnessed a number of problems and challenges, the situation 
has more recently been stabilised to a certain degree, even if experts claim that 
hostilities may renew at any time. Over 200,000 people are estimated to have 
been killed and at least 2.5 million have been displaced.  
The UN first called attention to the Darfur crisis in 2003, giving top 
priority to the adoption of the decision that would offer a long-term solution to 
the problem for the Security Council and two successive UN Secretaries-
General. In addition to the efforts for a political solution, the UN, in cooperation 
with its partners, has given the highest amount of aid to Darfur and the refugee 
camps set up in Chad and the Central African Republic.
14
 
The Darfur Peace Agreement, achieved under the aegis of the African 
Union (AU) and with the support of the UN and its partners, was signed on May 
5th 2006.
15
 An intensive diplomatic and political campaign has been conducted 
in order to involve non-signatory parties in the peace process. In addition to that, 
the UN has provided logistics and technical support to the observers sent to 
Darfur since 2004 as well as drawn up and implemented plans for the 
multidimensional peace-keeping operation and the setting up of a joint UN-AU 
‘Hybrid Force’.16 
                                                 
10 Center on International Cooperation: Annual review of global peace operations, p. 42 and 
János Besenyő: Logistic Experiences: The Case of Darfur, p. 42 
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 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/321/37/PDF/N0532137.pdf?OpenElement 
(downloaded 03.02.2010) 
12 Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, 
security, and governance, 86-87. oldal 
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 http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=890 (letöltés ideje: 2010. 02.03) 
14 Robert O. Collins: Civil wars and revolution in the Sudan: essays on the Sudan, pp. 158-159 
15 Center on International Cooperation: Annual review of global peace operations, p. 30 
16 Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, 
pp. 10 and 47 
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The decision adopted at the November 16
th
 2006 high-level meeting in 
Addis Ababa (attended by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the 
representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
delegates of the Sudan government, AU countries and other countries and 
organisations having political influence in the region as well as some countries 
sending troops to the African Union Mission in Sudan) proposed the 
establishment of a joint AU-UN peace-keeping force. Sudan gave its approval to 
the deployment of the contingent in June 2007. The operation of the contingent 
officially began on January 1
st
 2008, by incorporating existing AU troops in 
Darfur into its organisation.
17
 
On July 30
th
 2004, by Resolution 1556, the Security Council adopted an 
arms embargo against all non-governmental entities and individuals in Darfur, 
including the Janjaweed militia.
18
 Resolution 1591, adopted in 2005, increased 
the severity of the sanctions by extending the validity of the arms embargo and 
ordering a travel ban against and the freezing of the assets of four individuals, 
including two insurgence leaders, a former commander of the Sudan air force 
and the leader of the pro-government militia. Unfortunately, as Sudan, as a state, 
was not included in the embargo, the Janjaweed have been continuously 
supplied with weapons and equipment by government forces. 
UN humanitarian organisations are currently coordinating the largest aid 
campaign worldwide, in an attempt to give assistance to about 4.2 million 
people afflicted by the Darfur crisis. Of these, 2.5 million have been forced to 
migrate within Sudan, whereas 236,000 currently live in refugee camps in Chad. 
This year alone, Darfur will receive an aid of $650 million. Coordinated by 13 
UN agencies, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent and 80 NGOs, over 12,000 
humanitarian aid workers currently operate in the region, helping those in 
distress.
19
  
In recent years, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people have been 
saved by this humanitarian activity. The mortality rate has been reduced below 
the critical level and general malnutrition has been reduced by fifty percent 
compared to the peak of the crisis in mid-2004. Nearly three-fourths of the 
Darfur population now have access to healthy drinking water. However, the 
forceful displacement of the population has continued as a result of raids from 
all sides, affecting app. 140,000 people during the first five months of 2007 
alone.
20
 A lot of refugee camps, however, have reached the limits of their 
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 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.shtml (downloaded 03.02.2010) 
18 Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, 
security, and governance, p. 86 
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 http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/ (downloaded 02.02.2010) 
20 Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, 
security, and governance, pp. 87-88 
 100 
capacity and tensions have grown with the increase of the number of refugees. 
Despite the relative ‘peace’ in Darfur during recent months, most refugees have 
not dared to return to their ransacked homes. Instead, they are attempting to stay 
at the camps for as long as possible.
21
 
The humanitarian mission and its personnel are particularly exposed to 
violence. Since June 2007, 132 persons employed by the mission have been 
kidnapped for various periods, 35 convoys have been assaulted or ransacked and 
64 vehicles have been hijacked. Some NGO’s have withdrawn from the country 
because of the violence.
22
 
According to UN estimates, over half million people still have no access 
to any kind of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. Since, however, in February 
2007, that number was 900,000, the efforts, often entailing major sacrifices, of 
the humanitarian workers, with a view to accessing people in the areas afflicted 
by the crisis have been successful, despite the unchanging security situation. The 
UN has put the Khartoum authorities under continuous pressure with a view to 
improving the security of aid workers and the accessibility of the population, as 
a result of which a joint communication was issued in April 2007 by the Sudan 
government and the UN in order to ensure and promote efficient humanitarian 
activities in Darfur. 
The map below shows the major refugee camps, with the estimated 
number of their inhabitants: 
 
Source: 
ttp://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Darfur_refugee_camps_map.gif 
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62 percent of the Darfur aid campaigns are financed by donors, having 
earmarked $396 million of the desired $652 million since June 15
th
 2007, 
primarily for food aid. Since some other areas are rather underfinanced, further 
offerings are required.  
Let us, however, return to 2005, the year the Republic of Hungary 
contributed to the operation of the EU-AU JLOC-Joint Logistic Operational 
Centre by sending a military advisor (logistics specialist).
23
 Appointed for the 
position of the expert, I travelled to the mission area on June 28
th
 2005, setting 
to work without delay. 
We were responsible for the full supply and servicing of the Darfur 
mission. The mission area was divided into 8 sectors.  A unit the size of a 
battalion was deployed in each sector by setting up camps operated by the force 
of about a company in addition to the battalion command.
24
 The camps were 
established in the vicinity of major settlements and refugee camps in the clear 
hope that they would have a positive influence on the security of their respective 
area. While initially it went according to plan, later on the AU was no longer 
able to guarantee even the security of its own camps.
25
 
The sectors were divided in a way that they were assigned under national 
control, i.e. the unit deployed in each sector (Rwandan, Nigerian, Senegalese or 
South African) gave the sector commander and the substantial part of the staff. 
Since Nigeria and Rwanda sent the most troops, 3 battalions each, each could 
control 3 sectors, while the Senegalese and South Africans shared the remaining 
two.
26
 
A Gambian company and a Kenyan military police unit were responsible 
for servicing the mission command and the alert service. The soldiers were 
under the command of a Nigerian general. Some of the policemen were 
accommodated in the same camp as the soldiers, while a smaller part 
permanently remained at the posts set up in the refugee camps. The policemen 
were under the command of a South African police general. 
The following map shows the locations of the AMIS sectors and the 
camps: 
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 Markus Derblom, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jennifer Schmidt: UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace 
Operations in Africa, pp. 40-41 
24 Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, 
p. 31 
25
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Source: AMIS 
The Cease Fire Committee (CFC) was also located at the general 
headquarters in El Fasher. While it was led by the politician heading the 
mission, the work was in fact done by his deputy, a French general delegated by 
the EU (civilian employees were also under his command). Unfortunately, the 
soldiers, policemen, the members of the ceasefire committee and civilians were 
all carrying out their tasks without any kind of coordination or joint command. 
In fact, open hostilities were not uncommon between them.
27
 Obviously, it 
negatively affected work until these components were finally put under joint 
control in late 2006.  
At that time the mission’s military component did not have a separate 
CIMIC division (G9). Such issues were addressed by the operational division 
(G3), the logistics division (G4) and the ceasefire monitoring committee when it 
was necessary.
28
 
                                                 
27 Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, 
pp. 40-42 and János Besenyő: Logistic Experiences: The Case of Darfur, p. 55 
28 Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, 
pp. 20-21 
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As is known, the CIMIC can be applied in Crisis Response Operations 
(CRO), when military leaders are required to take into consideration the social, 
political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors 
of the operational area. In addition to the above, they also need to reckon with 
the presence of a large number of international and non-governmental 
organisations, whose objectives, techniques and future activities must be 
reconciled with military interests. The presence of the media and the (legitimate 
and less justifiable) expectations of the local and the international community 
present an added challenge in peace-keeping operations. It results from the 
above that efficient relations between civil organisations and the military are of 
fundamental importance with a view to resolving the conflict. While CIMIC 
would therefore be responsible for the communication between the military and 
civilians, the borderlines often become blurred, often requiring CIMIC experts 
to also maintain relations of a political nature. 
As is known, the long-term objective of CIMIC activities is to establish, 
maintain and improve cooperation with the civil population and institutions in 
the area of operation (governmental and non-governmental, international and 
regional organisations) in order to ensure the success of the mission (with the 
slightest possible interference with civilian life!) and the establishment and 
maintenance of the conditions required for the resolution of the crisis. 
Since the mission lacked a special CIMIC division, the following tasks 
were addressed on an ad hoc basis by the offices of the operational and logistics 
divisions and of the AU diplomat leading the mission: 
- All levels of communication with civil organisations. 
This was done mainly by civilians, as the staff of the AU diplomat 
heading the mission included a civilian press communications official and a 
humanitarian official (the African Union ultimately managed to send a civil 
expert to the centres of each of the three Darfur federal states to work in 
cooperation with the humanitarian organisations). Obviously, the logistics 
division also maintained a continuous relationship with the non-governmental 
organisations engaging in charitable and humanitarian activities in the mission 
area. We often gave them purified and chlorinated water, among other things, or 
provided, in cooperation with the operational division, armed escort for their 
shipments or occasional pre-dispensation storage capacity. 
- Involving specific NGO’s, which possessed the required 
information, in the strategic and operational planning of the mission (both 
before and during the operations). 
This was particularly important in order to prevent unfriendly reception 
by the communities along the routes of our convoys from. On one occasion, we 
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only a minimum number of armed escort were available to protect a convoy 
passing through a specific region. We added another mistake by failing to 
negotiate with local leaders (the ‘umdah’) and the armed SLA personnel 
operating in the region. The convoy was attacked halfway between our camps, 
near Khor Abechi. Two civilian drivers and five soldiers from the escort were 
killed in the attack. It was the first major loss of the AU since the launch of the 
mission.
29
 This was a consequence of the fact that the sector commander did not 
attribute importance to establishing good relations and consult with the ‘civilian’ 
population operating in the area to a reasonable extent. Obviously there were 
various other situations and events similar to the above, where their unique 
experience and local knowledge made civilians valuable to us and where we 
were able to cooperate with them with comparative success. Unfortunately, 
since the sectors were enjoying a kind of independence from the mission HQ 
(due to political and communication-related issues), communication and 
cooperation with NGO’s was often determined by the disposition, education or 
the personal interests of the commander. 
- The continuous monitoring and assessment of the civil 
environment, including the extent of needs and the method of satisfying 
such needs. 
It partly meant that the civil media communication employee monitored 
international, regional and local news, putting together a summary made 
available to the mission components. However, there were frequent problems 
with the flow of information from the civilians responsible for humanitarian 
matters, while hardly any information was received from the sectors and the 
camps unless in crisis situations. The latter included the raid on the town of 
Sheriya, when the first pieces of information on the conflict were received when 
the camp of the peace-keeping forces was surrounded by nearly 5,000 refugees 
without drinking water, food or shelter, added to which a cholera epidemic 
broke out among them within a week. If HQ had received the required 
information at the start of the hostilities, the escalation of the situation could 
have been prevented by negotiations (in which the peace-keepers could have 
played a mediatory role). The stationing and supply of the people fleeing from 
the city could also have been organised in cooperation with aid organisations 
and NGO groups. As I have said, the supply of needs also had an ad hoc nature, 
varying from sector to sector. In Sector 6, for example, where the South African 
battalion was stationed, very good relations were established between the 
inhabitants of the town of Kutum and the Sector command and the other camps 
within the Sector. In the Kulbus camp, a well was shared by the military and the 
civil population for a long time without problem (until another well was bored 
                                                 
29 Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, 
p. 28 
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by the Red Cross, supplying locals with drinking water). The South Africans 
also gave assistance to the restoration of a bridge and supplied useful devices to 
schools. While similar steps were taken in other sectors, too, they tended to be 
individual initiatives, which were sometimes supported by the mission 
command. 
At the El Fasher headquarters, a Nigerian Protestant minister organised 
church service for Christian officers and servicemen. While nearly 65 percent of 
the mission staff were Christian, since Sudan is a Muslim country, Christian 
religious services, even within the camps, could only be held under very strict 
conditions so as not to ‘offend’ Muslim sensitivity. At the end of the church 
services, the minister collected donations for the inhabitants of the nearby Abu-
Shouk refugee camp, Darfur’s one and only Christian church and the adjoining 
school. For me, that enterprise had added importance as I was personally 
affected. When I came back for a leave, I could show my sons under what kind 
of circumstances children had to live in the refugee camps. Horrified at the 
sight, they responded quite positively, deciding to send toys to refugee children. 
They took two days sorting their toys. Some toys were put in and then removed 
from the package three times, being so hard to part with. In the end, I carried 
two large kits of toys and a huge parcel of powdered instant soup (courtesy of 
the Knorr company) back to Darfur. Also, the Hungarian Baptist Charity sent 
money that enabled the construction of four additional classrooms in the school. 
While I was aware of various such initiatives, they were not officially supported 
by the mission command. 
- Monitoring activities of the military affecting the civilian sphere.  
This was mostly the task of the reconnaissance (G2) and the operational 
divisions. Based on their advice, the mission commander issued a uniform 
command to regulate the relations between the military and civilian 
organisations. Unfortunately, a number of fields were not covered by the 
regulation, occasionally enabling different legal interpretations. 
- Cooperation with the other organisations of the mission 
concerning the resolution or handling of specific situations. 
Among other things, the logistics service and the Force Medical Officer 
collectively arranged that the wounded inhabitants of a village raided near one 
of our camps (Graida) could receive medical treatment. In addition to that, 
medical treatment was also given on several occasions to local or tribal leaders 
regardless of their alliance with the insurgents or the government forces. Once 
we needed to resort to the help of the civilian company (PAE) serving the 
camps, in order to put nearly 20 injured Sudanese soldiers into safety from the 
insurgent troops attacking Sheriya. According to local custom, they would 
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probably have been executed by the occupying troops. However, we managed to 
put them in a cooling container out of use at the moment, which ultimately 
saved their lives. In addition to the risk of that move, it was also difficult to 
justify morally, as the Sudanese military and the Janjaweed kept terrorising, 
even murdering the local population and the inhabitants of the refugee camps.
30
 
Some were on the view that these Sudanese soldiers would only have been 
returned what they had done to the locals. In the end we hid them out of 
humanitarian considerations so they survived the two weeks of combat. Once 
the government troops recaptured the town and the soldiers returned to their 
barracks, relations between the camp and the representatives of the local power 
spectacularly improved and our work was no longer hampered by them. 
- Providing experts to Quick Impact Projects resulting in benefits 
for the mission. 
Their success also tended to be rather occasional, e.g. when various 
buildings had been damaged during the rainy season in the town of Marla 
located in the South African sector, which the South African technical staff 
helped to restore. While that enterprise was appreciated by the mission 
commander, later he refused to give permission to use the mission’s equipment 
in a similar project in another sector. Less than a week had passed between the 
two incidents and the security situation had not deteriorated in the mission, so 
nothing could possibly justify the refusal to give assistance, especially if one 
considers that a minimal expense would have been sufficient to gain the 
confidence of the population of a village located at hardly one kilometre from 
the camp. On the other hand, it was arranged that the camp physicians could 
hold consultation hours and give basic medical treatment to those in need in 
nearby settlements and refugee camps.  
- Drawing up forecasts and giving advice, if appropriate, to the 
civilian, military and police leaders in command of the mission.  
While all the divisions referred to above were involved in these activities, 
the commanders often did not even bother to read the forecasts. Even when 
harm had been done, the division leaders tended to hold them up for their own 
protection, without following the recommendations. 
These deficiencies alone were sufficient to prevent the achievement of the 
three chief functions of CIMIC: 
- Civil-military communication  
- The supporting of the civil environment  
-  The supporting of the armed forces 
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In the Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces, civil-military communication is defined as follows: 
‘The task of civil-military communication is to provide the required 
coordination in order to support and facilitate the planning and implementation 
of operations. The establishment of that communication in the early phase of 
planning and following the deployment of forces will lay the foundations for the 
development of further CIMIC functions. This will be an essential basis for the 
planning and development of the subsequent main CIMIC functions. 
Communication with the civil authorities and organisations is facilitated, among 
a lot of other things, by appropriate mass communications. It requires the timely 
communication of the achievements of civil-military cooperation with a view to 
facilitating the obtaining of the support of the population, the international and 
non-governmental organisations.’31 
As seen from the above, that function could not be fully achieved, due 
partly to organisational deficiencies as well as the fact that this area was not 
given sufficient importance at the beginnings of the mission. 
In the Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces, the supporting of the civil environment is defined as follows: 
‘A wide range of CIMIC activities are embraced by the supporting of the 
civil environment in accordance with the mission of the military forces 
employed. The support is normally governed by a non-civilian authority. It may 
encompass a wide range of military resources, including information, personnel, 
materials, equipment, communication facilities, devices, experts and training. It 
is normally established when and where this is an essential condition of the 
implementation of the military mission if local civil authorities and agencies are 
unable to carry out the specific task. The decision on the extent, duration and 
quantity of the aid must be adopted on a high level, taking into consideration 
political, military and civil factors.’32 
This should include, among other things, the plans for the evacuation of 
the civilian population, humanitarian aid (food and water supply), participation 
in the restoration of the critical infrastructure and, in cooperation with the 
NGO’s, the organisation of the stationing and supply of refugees. 
Even that could not be fully achieved, as the mission was only granted 
restricted rights by the Sudanese government.
33
 It must be kept in mind that 
Darfur is part of Sudan, a functional sovereign state despite its perception as a 
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 Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine for all services of the Hungarian Defence Forces, p. 10 
32
 Ibid. 
33 Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, 
security, and governance, pp. 85-86 
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‘pariah state’ under economic sanctions, in which members of the government 
and the militias aided by the government carry out activities against humanity 
(methodical genocide, the burning down of villages, etc.). In other words, the 
Sudanese sovereign power is, in theory, functional and it is extremely difficult to 
change anything from outside. The agreement between the AU and Sudan and 
the signing of various treaties (SOFA, SOMA) had all been in vain, since they 
were interpreted by the Sudanese authorities at their will, including deliberately 
obstructing peace-keeping activities on many occasions.
34
 Restrictions (curfews) 
were often extended to AMIS personnel. The issue of the evacuation of the 
civilian population was therefore quickly brushed aside whenever it was brought 
up, pleading that the Sudanese state machinery was working efficiently so there 
was no need for ‘foreigners’ to meddle in the problems of the local population. 
It could be observed in other respects that the Sudanese military/police units 
were, in concert with the Janjaweed militias, doing everything in order to 
achieve that as much of the native population should leave their homes and 
relocate into the refugee camps as possible.  It had various reasons. Firstly, this 
enabled government troops to eliminate the supply bases of the rebels (food, 
shelter, manpower replacement and information flow) with increased efficiency 
and, secondly, it was easier to control the population in refugee camps.
35
  
Since the camps were also under the control of the Sudanese government, 
humanitarian organisations were required a special permit in order to operate in 
the camps. During my service, several NGO’s were expelled because of giving 
some kind of trouble to the Sudanese authorities (for criticising the Sudanese 
police operating in the refugee camps for failing to defend inhabitants against 
the cruel acts of militias or often abusing the confidence of the people they were 
supposed to protect). 
Camp infrastructure, as such, was non-existent. The building of wells and 
latrines and any efforts with a view to organising the life of the camps were the 
results of the efforts of charitable organisations.
36
 As I have mentioned, the 
AMIS was only involved in such activities unofficially, on an ad hoc basis, 
especially as it lacked sufficient finances for the purpose.
37
 Activities concerning 
the refugees were mostly limited to the AU installing mobile police stations with 
Norwegian sponsorship in order to ensure increased protection to the refugees.
38
 
However, that program only partly lived up to the expectations, since the AU 
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policemen had very limited opportunities to intervene in the interest of camp-
dwellers (lack of authorisation, restrictions on the use of firearms, etc.).
39
 
 
In the Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces, the supporting of the forces is defined as follows: 
‘Within the area of operation, depending on the specific circumstances, 
commanders may, in various fields and on repeated occasions, need civilian 
support, the controlling of the population and local resources and, subsequently, 
access to civilian resources (fuel, food, water) and civilian sources of 
information. Commanders are required to make all efforts in order that the 
population accept the presence and the activities of (peace-keeping) troops as 
legitimate and lawful, with a view to gaining as wide support from the 
population as possible for the implementation of the operations. In that regard, 
CIMIC has a fundamental role.’40 
While the mission was initially received with great expectations by locals 
(the expectations concerning the peace-keepers had perhaps even been raised too 
high), their friendly attitude later turned into indifference or often even into open 
hostility. I heard a lot of complaints by locals that African soldiers had only 
come to Darfur to have three proper meals a day and draw a big wage. It is 
extremely difficult to explain to a person having one meal of millet or durrha a 
day and meat maybe once a week and having to spread out the daily wage of a 
peace-keeper (US$ 120 a day) for an entire month in order to support his family, 
that we have come to help him. It is particularly difficult if he sees that the 
observers do nothing but sit in their camps for weeks, sometimes patrol, without 
really helping civilians, while the same people rule over them who have caused 
their plight in the first place.  
They also took offence when the peace-keepers failed to intervene in 
order to protect civilians when they were attacked by militiamen. In one of our 
camps, the distance between the camp and the village was only 6-700 metres, 
and therefore the relations between soldiers and locals became very friendly. 
One day the village was attacked, Janjaweed horsemen massacring over twenty 
people and burning down most of the village together with the mature crop still 
awaiting harvest, in full view of the observers. While a few soldiers and 
policemen wanted to intervene, which they did not receive permission for, on 
the grounds that ‘we are but peace-keepers who are not in the position to draw 
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the anger of the belligerent parties upon us and who must maintain our 
neutrality’. The observers watched the attack to the end, documenting it (taking 
photos during the raid and subsequently of the dead) and reporting it to HQ.  
Understandably, the villagers were later not really disposed to make 
friends with the peace-keepers. In 2007, unidentified armed persons attacked the 
camp, killing eight and leaving further eight peace-keepers seriously wounded.
41
 
Later it was found that one of the attacking groups had come from that village…  
When all is said and done, rather than gaining the widest possible support 
from the civilian population, the AMIS even managed to lose its initial 
support.
42
 Unfortunately, the joint UN-AU Hybrid Force was similarly unable to 
win the effective support of the local population as the latter tended to consider 
the peace-keeping troops parasites who drew a salary despite failing to protect 
them from the armed attackers belonging to various groups. In addition to that, 
peace-keepers also had to face being regarded targets by both government and 
insurgent troops during attacks.
43
 In order to fully achieve these objectives, the 
African Union would have needed CIMIC abilities, which did not even exist at 
the time, even if some elements of the organisation managed to incorporate 
some of the tasks into their sphere of activities. The CIMIC only represented an 
additional task to the divisions on top of their activities. This ability can be 
considered available if the following three elements exist and ‘function’: 
- Theory: established guidelines, doctrine and concepts 
- Training and exercise: The ability to translate the doctrine into 
practice (training, exercise and general preparedness) 
- Physical component: The availability of the actual capacity, 
representing a trained personnel, deployed units and support units. 
Since the African Union was a recently established organisation (even if 
its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, had been operating for 
decades), the AMIS being its first official military mission, it did not have 
doctrines and guidelines in accordance with the planning system of the 
organisation or the required system of planning and procedures in the field in 
question (CIMIC).
44
 Obviously, that left its mark on the activity of the mission. 
While in their declarations, AU politicians have kept emphasising that the 
Darfur peace-keeping mission was the first independent African mission, this is 
not really so. Previously, they had launched a mission in the territory of 
Burundi, which soon collapsed due to the lack of organisation, insufficient 
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training and the lack of required funding (when South Africa had withdrawn 
their sponsorship). The UN had to intervene at very short notice by taking over 
the mission, in order to prevent further loss of prestige.
45
 Now it is clear that a 
similar situation was arrived at in the Darfur mission, which, for that matter, 
could only be maintained by the serious funding and the provision of equipment 
by the US, the NATO, the UN and the EU. As a consequence of the typical 
African circumstances (corruption, scrappy planning, insufficient funds, rivalry, 
etc.), the EU had to take over the command of the mission yet again, even if this 
was carried out under a ‘joint’ UN-AU peace-support operation in order to keep 
up appearances.
46
 
It is already clear that the AU’s third mission in Somalia may end up in a 
similar situation as the only troops so far have been a 2,700-strond contingent 
sent by Uganda,
47
 and 3 Burundian battalions.
48
 While the envisaged strength 
would be 8,000 troops, African countries are reluctant to command the troops 
they have offered to Somalia.
49
 
It shows that despite the quick establishment of the AU, apart from the 
distribution of the leading positions, they have not been able to carry out any 
serious work in the field of peace-supporting operations, which has partly been 
due, as I have said, to the lack of established doctrines and concepts. That does 
not only apply to CIMIC.  
Training, exercises and general preparedness are similarly problematic, 
due to the fact that, rather than sending the experts supposed to carry out CIMIC 
activities, the people delegated to the various NATO, UN and EU courses, 
seminars and conferences are still selected in a sort of ‘feudatory’ fashion. I 
remember receiving a training group from the Norfolk NATO command who 
held seminars on CIMIC activities among other topics, for several weeks.
50
 The 
courses were chiefly attended by the senior officials of the mission, while the 
executive personnel were only enrolled in the trainings every once in a while. 
When I left the mission, there was a field officer who had attended all the 
courses offered for the AMIS by other international organisations, despite the 
fact that they were completely irrelevant in his position. This reminded me of 
the situation in Hungary after the fall of Communism, when staff members 
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about to retire were sent on 10-month intensive language courses and other 
foreign trainings of varying length, while the effective strength carrying out the 
actual operations were thinking wistfully of such opportunities. Fortunately, 
while we have left that kind of thinking behind, the AU still appears to be at that 
stage. Obviously, it would not be a problem if the commanders were the first to 
receive such types of trainings provided that they drew the required conclusions 
and applied them in the future or they were incorporated in their training system 
(Lessons Learned). Unfortunately, this was not achieved while I was in the area 
and the situation has improved at a very slow pace ever since.  
Today, while the mission now employs experts responsible for 
humanitarian issues and for liaising with the various charitable civil 
organisations, professional CIMIC staff are still not available, there is no trained 
personnel or established units specialising in implementing such tasks and the 
required support capacities are also missing. 
After the UN took over the Darfur mission, changes were also effected in 
these respects, as the leaders of the UN had realised that CIMIC abilities have 
become indispensable with a view to the success of peace-supporting operations. 
However, they have been unable to fully make up for the shortcomings of the 
training of the incoming officers and soldiers. While a remote training program 
has been launched, its results are still to be seen.
51
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Nóra Nábrádi 
 
 
WHAT IS ASSESSED IN THE STANAG LEVEL 2 READING 
COMPREHENSION EXAM? 
 
 
Summary 
Being a multinational organisation, NATO has always attached considerable 
importance to the teaching and testing of the English language, which has 
intensified in the last few years due to a massive increase in joint military 
operations. The adoption of the NATO STANAG 6001 in 1976 responded to a 
need to define language proficiency: it provided (and still does) a common scale 
with formal descriptions of the base levels in four skills (listening, speaking, 
reading and writing). All member countries that develop their own NATO 
STANAG 6001 language testing system must observe and act in compliance with 
the common scale. This paper, after presenting a brief overview of the STANAG 
6001 scale and the testing of reading, examines the four tasks of the STANAG 2 
reading comprehension exam accredited in Hungary. The focus of my analysis is 
on looking at the reading sub-skills the tasks are intended to measure and also 
relating the text types to the common scale (NATO STANAG 6001 Edition 3). 
 
 
Introduction 
Of the two official languages (English and French) at NATO, English has 
become the operational language, and the teaching and testing of English in 
NATO countries have had special importance in the last few years due to the 
accession of new member states and a considerable number of joint tasks, e.g. 
exercises, training, operations, posting at multinational NATO headquarters. 
English language teaching and testing carry high stakes for individual military 
professionals and the member (and partner) countries alike. To ensure 
interoperability in joint operations or NATO positions, military (and civilian) 
